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The euphoria that greeted the signing of 
the Kyoto Protocol in December 1997 
has all but evaporated. The Annex-1 or 
developed countries will not achieve 
even the modest 5% average reduction 
that they agreed to in Kyoto from their 
1990 emissions by 2012. The developed 
countries have postponed meeting their 
targets by 10–15 years without penalty, 
worsening climate impacts and pressures 
on developing countries1. The feeling of 
despair that mankind may be unable to 
come to grips with climate change is  
exacerbated by tedious diplomatic pos-
turing that goes on at each annual con-
ference of the parties to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change, such as the most recent 
ones at Bali and Poznan, and the several 
intermediate meetings held at Bonn. 
 Before giving in to despondency at our 
collective inability to solve this global 
problem, it is useful to recall that we are 
well on the way to solving another global 
problem, that of stratospheric ozone  
depletion. Ambassador Richard Bene-
dick, the Chief Negotiator for the US at 
the Montreal Protocol has hailed the 
agreement as ‘one of the great interna-
tional achievements of the 20th century’2. 
Tim Flannery, the famous Australian  
author goes even further: ‘the Montreal 
Protocol marks a signal moment in  
human societal development, for it repre-
sents the first ever victory by humanity 
over a global pollution problem’3. The 
resolution of stratospheric ozone deple-
tion problem led many analysts, including 
a recent editorial in Nature4, to believe 
that similar success would be forthcom-
ing in the climate change arena. In this 
paper, we examine the similarities and 
differences between the two problems to 
see what the ozone problem can teach us, 
and the factors that make the climate 
problem a harder nut to crack. 
 A convention or a treaty is a binding 
agreement between two or more sover-
eign states. When a treaty is a statement 
of broad principles, it is called a frame-
work convention. Conventions allow for 
more specific agreements to be negoti-
ated later. These are called protocols. 
Both conventions and protocols are often 
named after cities where negotiations are 
concluded. Each international agreement 
is separately negotiated, signed, and  
enters into force ‘only when it is ratified’ 
(usually by federal legislatures) by a 
specified number of signatory countries. 
Both the ozone and the climate change 
problems have their governing frame-
work conventions and protocols. Table 1 
shows the history of the international 
agreements on the two problems. 
 While the time difference between the 
signing of the Vienna Convention and 
the UNFCCC was 7 years, that between 
the Montreal Protocol and the Kyoto 
Protocol was 10 years and that between 
the two sets of agreements in Copenha-
gen will be 17 years, reflecting the more 
difficult nature of the climate problem. 
A brief history of the science of 
stratospheric ozone depletion  
and climate change 
The primary gases involved in both 
global problems are gases prized for their 
inertness, with the exception of methane. 
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and hydro-
fluorocarbons (HFCs) are primarily  
responsible for ozone depletion, and car-
bon dioxide (CO2) for climatic change. 
While CFCs are manufactured products, 
in most instances CO2 is generally a 
waste product (except in carbonated 
drinks). Generations of engineers have 
been taught that in order to maximize 
combustion efficiency obtained with a 
carbonaceous fuel, it is best to ensure 
that all carbon is converted to CO2. Both 
CFCs and CO2 were initially thought not 
to pose environmental pollution prob-
lems because in addition to being inert, 
they are neither toxic nor flammable. 
They do not easily react or break down. 
But because of that stability, once  
released they last a long time in the  
atmosphere. As Flannery has written, ‘it 
is their stability that is a key factor in the 
damage they cause’3. 
 Sherwood Rowland, Mario Molina and 
Paul Crutzen were the first to link in 
1974 CFCs to depletion of ozone. As is 
commonplace in science with most new 
theories, there was no early agreement 
among the scientific community. Ozone 
science, until the late seventies, was 
more disputed than climate science of 
today2. However, because heterogeneous 
reactions involving stratospheric ice par-
ticles at temperatures below –75°C had 
been disregarded5, the detection of the 
ozone depletion over the Antarctic in 
May 1985 came sooner, and was much 
larger than anyone, including Molina and 
Crutzen, expected5. It was the American 
NASA satellite team that coined the 
 
 
Table 1. International agreements on stratospheric ozone depletion and climate change 
 Stratospheric ozone depletion Climate change 
 
Governing  Year Year entered  Year Year entered  
agreements   Agreement negotiated into force Agreement negotiated into force 
 
Framework Convention Vienna Convention on  1985 1988 UN Framework 1992 1994 
   the Protection of     Convention on 
   Ozone Layer    Climate Change  
Protocols Montreal Protocol 1987 1990 Kyoto Protocol 1997 2005 
Amendments London 1990 1992    – – – 
Amendments Copenhagen 1992 1994 Copenhagen  2009 – 
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evocative phrase ‘Antarctic ozone hole’. 
This expression played a large part in 
grabbing media and public attention. 
More accurately, ‘there was a depletion 
of ozone rather than an actual hole in the 
ozone layer’6. Later in 1995, Crutzen, 
Molina and Rowland were to share 
equally the Nobel Prize for Chemistry.  
 In 1988, four assessment panels (sci-
entific, environmental, technology and 
economic) were established under Article 
6 of the Montreal Protocol, whose terms 
of reference were approved by countries 
in 1989. A year later, the Technology 
and Economic Assessment Panels were 
merged. These three panels provide  
independent, technical and scientific  
assessments to the countries of the Mont-
real Protocol. There was early consensus 
that all the identified impacts of ozone 
depletion, such as increased incidence of 
skin cancers or cataracts, affected all re-
gions adversely. 
 The origins of scientific studies of the 
enhanced greenhouse effect go back  
almost two centuries. In 1824, Joseph 
Fourier of France calculated that the 
earth would be a colder place if it lacked 
an atmosphere. We owe the discovery 
that greenhouse gases block outgoing in-
frared to the Irish-British scientist John 
Tyndall who in 1859 also suggested that 
changes in their concentrations could 
change climate. The Swedish scientist, 
Svante Arrhenius published the first  
estimate in 1896 of how much the globe 
would warm with a doubling in the con-
centrations of CO2. Arrhenius won the 
Nobel Prize for Chemistry in 1903.  
Arrhenius thought that he was dealing 
with a very long-term problem. Extra-
polating from then essentially European 
rates of consumption of fossil-fuels, he 
estimated that it would take 3000 years 
for the global pre-industrial CO2 concen-
tration of 280 ppm to double. He was 
wrong by a factor of almost 20. In the 
absence of concerted action, a doubling 
somewhere in the middle of this century 
can be expected. 
 For the next 60 years or so, the signi-
ficance of Arrhenius’s calculation  
remained by and large unrecognized. The 
International Conference on the Assess-
ment of the Role of Carbon Dioxide and 
Other Greenhouse Gases in Climatic 
Variations and Associated Impacts,  
organized by the International Council of 
Scientific Unions, the World Meteoro-
logical Organization, and the United  
Nations Environment Programme at Vil-
lach, Austria in October 1985 was a turn-
ing point. Assessing the painstaking 
scientific work of the past three decades, 
this conference reiterated the consensus 
amongst scientists about the inevitability 
of global warming. The discovery that 
other trace gases add to the warming 
caused by carbon dioxide meant that sig-
nificant changes could be expected 
within a lifetime rather than in some dis-
tant future. Abandoning their characteris-
tic caution, scientists from 29 countries 
at this conference concluded that ‘human 
releases of greenhouse gases could lead 
in the first half of the 21st century to a 
rise of global temperature . . . greater 
than any in man’s history’. They also 
urged ‘active collaboration between sci-
entists and policymakers to explore the 
effectiveness of alternative policies and 
adjustments.’ 
Inter-governmental efforts 
Governments in the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly decided in 1988 to esta-
blish the Inter-governmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), a joint pro-
gramme of the WMO and UNEP, to pro-
vide ‘policy-relevant but not policy-
prescriptive’ advice. It was around this 
time that the term ‘global warming’ or 
the scientifically more correct term ‘en-
hanced greenhouse effect’ were dropped 
in favour of the more neutral ‘climate 
change’7. The IPCC published its first 
report two years later in 1990, establish-
ing that emissions of greenhouse gases 
resulting from human activities were 
substantially increasing their atmos-
pheric concentrations and that under a 
business-as-usual scenario, the 21st cen-
tury would witness an increase in global 
mean temperature greater than any seen 
in the past 10,000 years. As a result of 
this assessment, the UN General Assem-
bly established the Intergovernmental 
Negotiating Committee in December 
1990, which drafted the UNFCCC. More 
than 140 countries with differing inter-
ests participated in the negotiations. It 
was signed by 154 heads of states at the 
Earth Summit in Rio in 1992 and came 
into force in 1994 (see Table 1). To date, 
188 countries have ratified the conven-
tion. 
 Since the convention had ‘only the 
vaguest of commitments regarding stabi-
lizing of concentrations and no commit-
ments at all on reductions’, the first 
Conference of the Parties to the Conven-
tion in Berlin agreed to negotiate a pro-
tocol to define more precisely the 
emission reduction commitments of  
developed countries. It took two years to 
negotiate the Kyoto Protocol (1995–97) 
and another 8 years for it to come into 
force, when countries representing 55% 
of the developed country emissions had 
ratified (Table 1). The US declared its 
intention not to ratify the protocol in 
2001. The protocol specifies that countries 
should initiate in 2005 (and conclude by 
2009) the consideration of commitments 
for the post-2012 period. 
 Because the IPCC formation preceded 
the convention, unlike the panels of the 
Montreal Protocol, it is outside the  
formal convention process. The IPCC too 
has three panels called Working Groups, 
the first dealing with science, the second 
dealing with impacts and the third deal-
ing with response measures. While there 
are many indications of changing climate 
due to human actions, there is no clinch-
ing ‘smoking gun’, as in the case of the 
annually recurring Antarctic ozone ‘hole’. 
This is one reason why some continue to 
be skeptical about the timing and the  
extent of climate change and many pol-
icy makers refuse to commit to costly 
immediate action. The skeptical group 
does not represent scientific mainstream 
consensus and its views are consigned 
more and more to the fringes. In policy 
making circles, however because the re-
quired mitigation strategies are often 
fraught with risks as large as the problem 
itself8, gingerly response is still the 
mainstream view. 
The role of the United States 
International agreements rarely fructify 
without some countries assuming leader-
ship positions and nudging the agenda 
forward. In the ozone negotiations, des-
pite a conservative administration, the 
US had assumed a leadership position. In 
the 70s the US accounted for almost one-
half of the global CFC use, most of it in 
aerosol sprays. In less than two years and 
without any government regulation,  
adverse publicity about harm to the 
ozone layer had caused the market for 
such sprays to drop by two-thirds9. The 
US Senate ratified the Montreal Protocol 
83–0 in March 1988. A combination of 
factors was responsible for this lopsided 
vote. A US company (DuPont) had sub-
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stitutes in the pipeline, the US had  
already reduced its consumption, and 
wanted other competing countries 
(mainly European) to do the same, and 
the developing countries then accounted 
for only a very small fraction of global 
consumption. Also, the Reagan admini-
stration in its second term was worried 
about its environmental legacy10. 
 Until very recently, the US was also 
the highest emitter of greenhouse gases, 
responsible for a quarter of the total 
emissions (rather than half as in the case 
of CFCs). After the US Vice President 
Al Gore’s personal intervention to break 
the deadlock in negotiations in Kyoto in 
December 1997, the US more or less 
ceded the leadership of the climate issue 
to the European Union. Even before the 
Kyoto Protocol, the US Senate passed in 
July 1997 the even more lopsided and 
bipartisan Hagel-Byrd Resolution 95–0 
stating that the United States would not 
be a signatory to any protocol which 
would mandate commitments to limit its 
greenhouse gas emissions, unless the 
protocol also mandated commitments to 
limit greenhouse gas emissions from  
developing countries within the same  
period. Partly because the Kyoto Proto-
col was not in consonance with the US 
Senate’s resolution, it was never submit-
ted to it for ratification. 
The costs of responding and  
burden sharing 
Only a half a dozen or so chemicals cause 
stratospheric ozone depletion. Chemical 
companies were working on the deve-
lopment of substitutes even before the 
reduction targets of the Montreal Proto-
col were announced. In the end, substi-
tutes ended up costing much less than 
forecast as the impending controls forced 
many industries to change entire pro-
cesses and find more ingenuous, efficient 
and productive ways of doing things than 
they did before. CFCs were only one 
small segment of the worldwide chemi-
cal industry. 
 Only 20 countries negotiated the  
Vienna Convention and thirty countries 
the Montreal Protocol. Most developing 
countries were uninvolved and uninter-
ested as initially the reduction targets 
were firm with tight deadlines, but provi-
sions for technology transfer and the 
coverage of incremental costs were 
vague. The subsequent history of Mont-
real Protocol shows that developing 
countries accepted ‘limitations on their 
CFC consumption only when they were 
assured of equitable access to new tech-
nologies’2. Participation of India and 
other developing countries came with the 
London Amendments when the firmer 
provisions for technology transfer and 
the payment of incremental costs by  
developed countries were agreed. These 
costs were thought to be small (and 
proved to be smaller) and developing 
countries were not yet widely perceived 
to be competitive threats at the beginning 
of the nineties. These positive incentives 
were coupled with the threat of trade 
sanctions against countries not joining or 
complying with the protocol. Some deve-
loping countries, such as India, became 
even more enthusiastic participants when 
the initial agreement requiring per cent 
reductions were tightened and replaced 
by phase-out requirements. This earlier 
reluctance was coloured by not wanting 
to determine who could continue to emit 
and who could not, and an inadequate 
capacity to enforce that determination.  
 In the climate arena, again there are 
only a handful of gases that significantly 
affect radiative forcing, but most of the 
emissions come from the energy sector 
which is far more pervasive in modern 
societies. Again, the search for renew-
able energy substitutes dates to at least 
the seventies, a decade earlier than the 
initial calls by scientists to curtail the 
emissions of greenhouse gases. Despite 
impressive recent growth, renewable  
energy systems still generate globally a 
miniscule fraction of electricity and pro-
vide a miniscule fraction of liquid fuels 
used in transportation systems. Although 
the cost of power generation from re-
newables is declining, their levelized per 
unit prices for base load remain higher 
than those from their fossil competitors. 
 In the case of ozone, in the first decade 
1987–97, the world in total had spent  
approximately US$ 235 billion to contain 
the problem. The cumulative amount of 
north to south transfers were relatively 
modest, of the order of US$ 2 billion4. 
To reasonably address the climate pro-
blem, the total bill could potentially be 
relatively large, estimated by the Stern 
Review to be of the order of one per cent 
of gross world product11. Spending US$ 
500 billion a year for say, 40 years 
makes it a US$ 20 trillion problem. The 
transfers to developing countries have 
been variously estimated to be of the order 
of US$ 20–200 billion per year for  
the next 40 years or so12. Thus the cli- 
mate problem is at least a hundred times  
more expensive problem to tackle than the 
stratospheric ozone depletion and north–
south transfers could be a thousand times 
greater, something that the Nature edito-
rial does not mention4. The Multilateral 
Fund of the Montreal Protocol does offer 
a good model for the estimation of  
incremental costs in a technically compe-
tent fashion within the Montreal Protocol 
process. Therein, the clearly defined  
nature of ozone-friendly technologies 
eligible for funding and the level of 
funding for earth technology, have pro-
vided both predictability and transpar-
ency to developing countries. There is 
now a marked unwillingness in deve-
loped country legislative bodies to pay 
for all the incremental costs or to transfer 
technology without strings. Within a 
decade, there has been a change in the 
perception of developing countries from 
clients, customers and aid recipients, to 
potential and actual competitors. Table 2 
summarizes our discussion of the differ-
ences between the two problems.  
 Of course, given the collective depen-
dence on fossil fuels, a phase-out is cur-
rently off the table, only reductions are 
being negotiated. 
Concluding remarks 
The success of the ozone negotiations, 
coupled with the glacial pace of climate 
negotiations in the last decade, has 
caused some analysts to recommend 
agreements between a smaller group of 
major emitters2. Recent industrial history 
has shown how easy it is for manufactur-
ing to move from one country to another. 
For example, various estimates claim 
that 75% of China’s manufacturing is 
export-related and that a third of its GHG 
emissions may be attributable to exports13. 
Therefore only a truly global agreement 
will ensure that there is no ‘leakage’ or 
‘gaming’.  
 Eager and active participation of the 
US and China will be essential to the 
success of any global regime negotiated 
to tackle this problem. The current ad-
ministration in the US promised in its 
electoral campaign to undo many of the 
climate-related policies of the previous 
administration. Progress is still expected 
to be slow, in the absence of a catastro-
phic event such as the Antarctic ozone 
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Table 2. Differences between the stratospheric ozone and climate change problems 
Stratospheric ozone depletion         Climate change 
 
20 countries were involved in the original negotiations ~180 countries participate in climate negotiations 
Clinching scientific evidence in the form of ‘Antarctic ozone hole’ No smoking gun; evidence is incremental and cumulative  
Term ‘ozone hole’ is evocative Term ‘climate change’ is neutral  
All countries expect to lose Both losers and (at least initially) winners 
Three scientific assessment panels inside the formal Montreal Protocol  Three IPCC Working Groups outside the formal Convention 
 process for advice  Process provide advice 
US (and UNEP) leadership EU leadership 
US Senate ratified Montreal Protocol 87–0 US Senate opposed Kyoto Protocol 95–0 
Costs of developing substitutes reasonable Substitutes to fossil fuels for electricity and transport  
   currently expensive 
Developing countries were perceived by northern countries Developing countries perceived to be competitive threats 
 to be aid recipients 
Northern legislatures willing to transfer technology and resources  Northern legislatures unwilling to transfer technology and 
 to developing countries   resources to developing countries 
 
 
hole. Scientists have identified several 
potential candidates of such ‘tipping 
elements’ in the Earth’s climate system 
where tiny perturbations can qualitati-
vely alter the state or evolution of the 
system14. Monsoon is one of the well-
known ‘tipping elements’. Burns et al.15 
have shown that monsoon transitions 
from dry to wet have occurred very rap-
idly in the Indian Ocean about 50,000 
years ago. Data from the Socotra Island 
in the Indian Ocean have shown that the 
transition from weak to strong monsoon 
can occur in less than 25 years. This 
shows that concerns about abrupt climate 
change in the 21st century are serious16. 
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Soil fertility in physically degraded lands: are we overestimating? 
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During the green revolution, intensive 
agriculture increased food production on 
one hand and decreased soil fertility on 
the other. But reduced soil fertility is 
currently threatening the total food pro-
duction of the country by stagnating or 
reducing productivity. It is now obvious 
that if high productivity has to be sustai-
ned, not only should the productive capa-
cities of cultivated lands be increased, 
but hitherto uncultivated, physically  
degraded lands (henceforth referred as 
degraded lands) should be brought under 
cultivation. All this has to be achieved 
without compromising soil fertility. This 
is especially relevant in the wake of dis-
cussion on launching the second green 
revolution. Improving soil health is pos-
sible only when soil fertility is accurately 
estimated and suitable corrective mea-
sures are adopted. In our opinion, the 
present methodology for soil fertility  
estimation may be unsuitable for degra-
ded soils. Here, we explain this metho-
dological problem and highlight the 
possible consequences of adopting the 
present method for degraded soils. 
